Intelligence-led policing experiment reveals why digital reforms fail in Nigeria
Nigeria’s 2015 intelligence-led policing initiative shows how digital reforms can succeed initially but fade without sustained institutional support.
The swift arrest of the kidnappers of former Secretary to the Government of the Federation Olu Falae in September 2015 briefly showcased the promise of a new policing approach. Former Inspector General of Police Solomon Arase described intelligence-led policing as “the ultimate for Nigeria,” arguing that modern law enforcement must be driven by intelligence gathering, analysis and coordinated response rather than reactive policing.
More than a decade later, kidnapping has evolved into one of Nigeria’s most persistent security challenges. While intelligence-led policing remains part of modern law-enforcement practice, the trajectory of the initiative raises broader questions about how to build technology-enabled reforms that endure beyond their initial launch.
Over the past two decades, Nigeria has launched numerous digital governance platforms. Some, such as the National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN) and Treasury Single Account (TSA), have become integral to governance. Many others have been abandoned, superseded or only partially implemented. This fragmented approach has prompted the Nigerian government to introduce stricter oversight of public-sector digital investments after acknowledging widespread duplication of systems, poor interoperability and high project failure rates.
The experience of the 2015 intelligence-led policing initiative offers a useful lens for examining the difficulties of building sustainable digital public infrastructure within Nigeria’s security sector. Security sources indicate that the initiative contributed to tactical gains, including the disruption of kidnapping networks. Intelligence sharing improved during the period, enabling specialised units such as the Intelligence Response Team (IRT) to act on “evidence-based and actionable” information. Yet despite its early visibility, the initiative gradually faded from public view.
This pattern echoes the 2000s e-Government initiatives that promised to transform public service delivery. The mechanism then was different, but the result was the same: initial success, institutional neglect, and irrelevance.
The winners: the kidnappers, who adapted faster than the police. The losers: the Nigerian public, who continue to face kidnapping as a daily threat, and the institutions that cannot sustain the reforms they start.
Bottom Line: Intelligence-led policing worked. Then it faded. The lesson is not about policing. It is about Nigeria’s inability to sustain any reform beyond its first success.