The National Peace Committee recorded 109 breaches of the National Peace Accord across 26 states and the Federal Capital Territory between 19 August and 27 October 2026. The violations included 33 incidents of political violence, 29 cases of misinformation, 19 attacks on campaign activities and 15 incidents of intimidation. Kaduna recorded the highest number with nine cases, followed by Edo, Enugu and the Federal Capital Territory with seven each. The committee urged security agencies to investigate and protect lawful political activity.
The breakdown deserves a closer look. Political violence and intimidation together account for 48 of the 109 cases. Misinformation accounts for 29. Attacks on campaign activities account for 19. That is not a random distribution. It is a pattern in which the physical threat and the information threat run together. A rally is disrupted, a video spreads, and the two reinforce each other.
The geography is also revealing. Kaduna tops the list, which is unsurprising given its record since 2011. Edo, Enugu and the capital follow. Two of those are opposition-leaning states in the South, and the third is the seat of government. A peace accord that is breached most in the places where the contest is closest tells you the accord is being tested where it matters.
The commission also moved on the judicial front. Its chairman, Joash Amupitan, urged 375 nominated election tribunal officers to uphold judicial independence and prioritise substantive justice. That is the right instruction and the harder standard. A tribunal that decides on technicalities protects the result. A tribunal that decides on substance protects the vote. The two are not always the same.
The African Democratic Congress accused the commission of selectively condemning political threats. The commission warned against inflammatory electoral rhetoric in general terms. The charge of selectivity is easy to make and hard to disprove, which is why it sticks.
The precedent is the 2015 and 2019 accords, both of which were signed and both of which were breached. The 2015 accord worked partly because the candidates needed each other’s legitimacy. The 2023 cycle showed how quickly an accord becomes a photograph when the result is contested.
The winners are the committee, which has a record, and the tribunal officers, who have a clear instruction. The losers are the voters in Kaduna and Edo, who will attend rallies that someone has already decided to disrupt, and the accord itself, which is now a list of breaches rather than a guarantee.
Winners: The National Peace Committee, which has data. The tribunal officers, who have a clear standard. Losers: Voters in the highest-risk states. The accord’s credibility. The commission, which faces a selectivity charge it cannot easily rebut.
Bottom Line: A peace accord that is breached 109 times is not a peace accord. It is a logbook, and the only thing that changes behaviour is a prosecution.



